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Abstract - ISFOL PLUS (Participation Labour Unemployment Survey) allows for the 
observation of many economic and sociological phenomena that it was not possible to 
investigate with traditional sample surveys. In fact, the survey design, featuring only direct 
respondents, a quite large panel dimension, and a considerable sample, made it feasible to 
pose complex and specific questions on job seeking activities along with a wide set of 
socio-demographic controls. 
Using data from the ISFOL PLUS Survey, the paper focuses on the specific features of the 
Italian labour market and of the Italian Public Employment Services (PESs) so as to 
analyse the difficulties that they face in responding to the challenges posed by the Youth 
Guarantee (YG), both in terms of reorganisation and of strengthened financial effort.  
Focusing on the most recent innovations in the management of PES (including 
decentralisation, performance targeting, service integration, and the involvement of private 
actors), the paper enquires into the risks that the current nature and organisation of Italian 
PESs may, on the one hand, absorb YG measures in an excessively complex and inefficient 
system and, on the other hand, provide a very marginal support to an extremely large 
recipients audience, in this way jeopardising the effectiveness of the measures themselves.  
The paper’s argument does not point in the direction of those proposals hinting at the 
exclusion of PESs from the YG management in favour of private operators; it rather 
highlights the necessity of considerable investments for transforming PESs into ‘transition 
management services’, in order to face the challenges posed by the YG. 
Provocatively speaking, it seems that the main challenge/opportunity posed by the 
introduction of the YG in the Italian case is not as much in promoting the integration of 
young people in the labour market, as rather in reorganising PESs to make them able, in 
prospect, to ‘support sustainable labour transitions throughout workers’ careers’. 
 
Keywords: PES, searching, matching, Youth Guarantee, Isfol Plus, Panel Data 
JEL Classification:  J64; J20 J46 
 
1.Introduction 
The enduring and intensifying economic crisis experienced by most European Countries since 2008 
has determined an increasing demand of actual interventions to support youth employment 
especially. The Communitarian response to this emergency, as set out in Europe 2020 strategy's 
‘Youth on the Move’ flagship initiative, is an initiative of policy measures and funding known as 
Youth Guarantee (YG), drawing on the experience of some Northern European countries that first 
focused on issues such as youth employment conditions, individual and social costs of school 
dispersion, procrastination of economic independence, precarious entry into the labour market, late 
creation of new households. 
In Italy, a dedicated organisational office
1
 was created by the Ministry of Labour and Social Policy 
with the responsibility of creating databases, built a programme of actions shared among all levels 
                                                          
1
 The office is coordinated by the Secretary General of the Ministry of Labour and Social Policy and 
comprises of the Italian Institute for the Development of Vocational Training of Workers (ISFOL), the 
government agency Italia Lavoro, the Italian National Social Security Institute (INPS), competent Ministry 
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of public administrations and public and private institutions, with the purpose of leading to a 
“leapfrog in the way the unemployed, redundancy workers, and young people are taken care of, 
identifying and systematising the best practices available at national and European level” (Enrico 
Giovannini, Minister of Labour, 2013). 
Using data from the ISFOL PLUS (Participation Labour Unemployment Survey of the Institute for 
the Development of Vocational Training of Workers, www.isfol.it), the paper focuses on the 
specific features of the Italian labour market and of the Italian Public Employment Services (PES) 
so as to analyse the difficulties that they face in responding to the challenges posed by the YG (both 
in terms of reorganisation and of strengthened financial effort), as well as the risks implied by the 
adoption of foreign practices that are difficult to implement in the national context. 
Looking at the most recent innovations in the management of PES (including decentralisation, 
performance targeting, service integration, and the involvement of private actors), the paper 
enquires into the risks that the current nature and organisation of Italian PESs may, on the one hand, 
absorb YG measures in an excessively complex and inefficient system and, on the other hand, 
provide a very marginal support to an extremely large recipients audience, in this way jeopardising 
the effectiveness of the measures themselves. 
ISFOL PLUS allows for the observation of many economic and sociological phenomena that it was 
not possible to investigate with traditional sample surveys. In fact, the survey design, featuring only 
direct respondents, a quite large panel dimension, and a considerable sample, made it feasible to 
pose complex and specific questions on job seeking activities along with a wide set of socio-
demographic controls. 
The paper is organised as follows. The first two paragraphs briefly depict the content of the Italian 
YG proposals and the situation of national PES, respectively. In the third paragraph we illustrate 
how the ‘search’ and employment ‘consolidation’ phases are strictly connected in a process of 
continuous employment transitions over the entire active life. The fourth paragraph presents some 
examples and proposals for PES, and introduces descriptive statistics and panel estimates to 
‘microfound’ profiling choices. The paper ends with some conclusive remarks on the state of PES 
in the Italian context. 
2.The Youth Guarantee  programme in Italy 
Established in EU with the Council Recommendation of 22 April 2013, the Youth Guarantee (YG) 
envisions a new approach to tackling youth unemployment and, as the Recommendation reads, it 
basically, “… refers to a situation in which young people receive a good-quality offer of 
employment, continued education, an apprenticeship or a traineeship within a period of four 
months of becoming unemployed or leaving formal education”.  
For some EU countries, the YG simply represents a natural upgrading of their Public Employment 
Service (PES) System with the further development and/or strengthening of partnerships between 
employers and other relevant labour market players such as public and private employment 
services, youth services, schools and universities, trade unions, vocational training and career 
guidance services, interested governmental agencies and non-governmental organisations, and 
various levels of government.  
In this sense, the most innovative indication is probably derivable from the so-called Flagship 
Initiatives
2
 under the EU 2020 Strategy for smart, sustainable and inclusive growth where the 
                                                                                                                                                                                                
Directorates General, the State-Regions Conference, the Union of the Italian Provinces (UPI), and Chambers 
of Commerce. 
2
 Out of the seven Flagship Initiatives of the Europe 2020 strategy, the three that fall under the areas of 
employment, social affairs and inclusion are: ‘Youth on the move’, ‘An agenda for new skills and jobs’, and 
‘European platform against poverty and social exclusion’. 
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central position of PES’s to act as transition agencies for those who are most in need (and not just 
those who are unemployed) is advocated for. In order to function effectively and efficiently in their 
new role, PES’s are invited to modernise their organisation and service delivery, as well as to 
develop managerial and coordination competences necessary to build up the partnership-based 
approach required by the Recommendation. 
In the Italian system, the ‘taking charge’ feature of the PES model stressed by the European 
Recommendation was already envisioned in the legislative decree n. 181/2000, and the introduction 
of a modern management scheme to supervise the intermediation and transition phases for the 
labour market integration of young people, dates back to 1997
3
. However, with the YG, the Italian 
system is implicitly asked to adjust to more updated models and to universal schemes. This will 
necessarily require the overcoming of the current excessive fragmentation of measures implemented 
by different levels of government . The YG goals are expressed in a very explicit form, and so are 
the requirements for measurability and comparability of YG results. This kind of pragmatism is 
aimed at hindering the kind of recipes (and the Italian case is an example of those) where active 
labour market policies (ALMP) come down to a little bit of vocational training and a pinch of 
vocational guidance, losing sight of the actual strengthening in the person’s employability. 
The total estimated cost of establishing YG schemes in the Eurozone is €21bn a year (around 0.22% 
of GDP)
4
. As for the funding, the EU will top-up national spending on national YG schemes 
through the European Social Fund (ESF) and the €6bn Youth Employment Initiative (YEI). The YG 
endowment for Italy is approximately worth €567ml from YEI and €567ml from ESF, plus a 
national financing of 40%, all summing up to something between €1.5bn and 1.8bn. 
In Italy there are almost 6 million people aged 15-24 and 43.3% of them are unemployed, while 
73.3% of them (almost 4.5 million people) are inactive (ISTAT, June 2014). The number of 
estimated YG beneficiaries in Italy is between a minimum of 1.2 million persons (NEET’s aged 15-
24) and a maximum of 2.2 million persons (NEET’s aged 15-29). Also in consideration of the fact 
that the Italian Ministry of Labour recently confirmed its commitment to extend the YG to people 
aged 15-29, in order to have a reasonable and economically meaningful endowment per person, 
measures are being examined to reduce the number of beneficiaries by qualifying them in terms of 
vulnerability profiles. Funds will be available for the period 2014/2015 and 40% of them will be 
concentrated in some Regions, such as Campania (€215 ml), Sicily and Lombardy (€200ml). 
More in detail, the Italian Youth Guarantee Implementation Plan 2014-2020, released in February 
2014
5
, envisages: 1) a job offer, possibly associated with an employment incentive for the 
employer
6
; 2) an apprenticeship offer, also abroad; 3) a traineeship, possibly associated with a 
grant; 4) a voluntary civil service experience (with grant); 5) joining a transnational mobility 
programme; 6) joining a vocational education and training (VET) or formal education programme 
to complete own studies and/or acquire a professional specialisation; 7) guidance on 
entrepreneurship and self-employment. The unique access point is www.lavoro.gov.it and has been 
activated starting from 1 May 2014. 
The actual start of the measures envisioned by the YG depends on the existence of specific 
agreements between the Ministry of Labour and each Italian Region, as well as on the development 
                                                          
3
 Legislative Decree n. 469/1997. 
4
 The cost of inaction is, however, estimated to be much higher, with an estimated total cost from having 
young people not in employment, education or training, of €153bn (1.21% of GDP) a year in benefits and 
foregone earnings and taxes (EUROFOND, 2012) 
5
 See www.lavoro.gov.it. 
6
 The monetary incentive, paid by the Italian National Social Security Institute (INPS), varies from a 
minimum of €1,500.00 for a short-term employment contract (less than 12 months) and a maximum of 
€6,000.00 for a permanent contract. 
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of a Regional Implementation Plan with details on specific actions, funding, procedures, etc. In mid 
May 2014, only 13 Regions had signed such an agreement, while almost 30,000 young people 
joined the YG programme through the national portal, in the first week alone. 
Table 1 – YG cost estimates with respect to possible recipient sets, Italy - Forecasts 2013 
Age 
 
Type of 
education 
Volume 
 
Unemployed 
% 
Unemployed 
 
Offer 
 
Average 
cost 
Cost 
(000,000 
€) 
16 Qualification 
 VET 
104,813 41% 43,391 School reintegration or 
VET course 
€ 2,500 108 
17 
18 
19 Upper 
secondary  
Drop outs 
205,949 31-41% 72,783 University guidance or 
VET course or  
employment entry 
initiative 
€  7,000 509 
20 Drop outs  
I cycle 
tertiary ed. 
9,800 31% 2,940 University 
reintegration or VET 
course 
€ 3,000 9 
21 
22 University 
degree I 
cycle  
3-year 
105,857 30% 28,581 University guidance or 
VET course or  
employment entry 
initiative 
€  7,000 200 
23 Drop outs  
II cycle 
tertiary ed. 
9,029 30% 2,438 University 
reintegra on or VET 
course 
€ 3,000 7 
24 Un versity 
degree I 
cycle  
II cycle 
5-year 
101,219 27% 25,305 Employment entry 
initiative 
€ 7,000 198 
25 11,486 3,101 
26 
27 
  548,153  178,539   1,031 
Note. Each year, slightly less than 600,000 people aged 15-24 are in transition from the school 
system to the labour market. The real flow should be higher than the estimated one, because the 
calculation is based on a time longer than the 4 months considered by the YG. Moreover, the flows 
are concentrated at the end of school cycles, meaning that the system should be overloaded during 
the summer.  
Source: elaboration on Eurostat data 
The renowned heterogeneity of Italian Regions in terms of economic, social, demographic, and 
cultural differences  reflects in different policy choices and schemes to fight unemployment at the 
regional level. Many proposed interventions, both at the national and regional level, seem to be 
characterised by an extraordinary and sporadic nature, suggesting a sort of ‘temporary welfare’ with 
‘temporary rights’ as long as there are funds available rather than a set of stable measures, rights 
and services aimed at accompanying and supporting young people through their employment 
transitions as suggested by the Recommendation. The main risks are aggravation of labour market 
segmentation
7
 and the YG measures becoming just another “way to finance the private employment 
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 Speaking at the European Parliament on 7 April 2014, the Vice President of the European Youth Forum, 
Lloyd Russel-Moyle, said that the Youth Guarantee is a disappointment and is open to abuse, because it 
doesn't exclude unpaid internships. Young people should have a right to decent occupation, he stated, 
contesting the underlined idea that 'any job is a good job'. In fact, 42% of young EU workers are on 
temporary contracts (compared to 13% among adults); in some Member Countries (such as Poland and 
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services, now suffering for the decrease in demand, rather than a plan focusing on youth needs” 
(Oliveri, 2014). 
Some authors (Tiraboschi et al., 2014) suggest that the Italian YG is not to be considered as an 
actual set of measures to fight youth unemployment, but rather as an ALMP measure aimed at 
having more efficient job placement services, meaning that it will probably succeed in having 
already existent job vacancies emerge through a strengthening and a development of the PES 
intermediation function, but it will certainly not create new jobs. It is a measure to favour youth 
employability, not their employment. 
3.Public Employment Services in Italy 
With the new paradigm for labour market policy reform supported by the transitional labour 
markets approach, a new light is being shed on the role of PES that, in the Italian case, represents a 
trend reversion with respect to the recent past in which the PES has been delegitimised also through 
a constant reduction in available resources that partially explain its performance deficit
8
. 
In Italy, over 10 million persons visited a public employment office at least once in their life 
(Mandrone, 2011); over the last year, PES users amounted to 2.6 million (2 million if those visiting 
just for administrative purposes are excluded). PES employees amount to a total of roughly 10,000, 
and of those only 8.700 are in charge of providing services
9
. The average PES unemployed-to-staff 
ratio is 269:1 (down to 202:1 if those non requiring dedicated services are excluded). The North-
West is the area with the worst unemployed-to-staff ratio, while in the South of the Country, where 
there are over a million PES users per year, public employment offices are more numerous and 
larger in dimensions. 
The PES service demand has been analysed from the users-end, considering 5 indicators for the 
demanded services and provided services. The most demanded service, not surprisingly, concerns 
‘actual employment opportunities’ and ‘useful information for job search’. An increasing 
importance is assumed by the ‘certifying function’ of the PES: 80% of users is registered by an 
employment office and subscribed a Statement of Immediate Availability (‘Dichiarazione di 
immediata disponibilità’, DID), meaning that the administrative activity includes the responsibility 
of certifying the users’ status (registration, subsidy recipient, DID, and so on), the engagement on a 
path defined by the YG, and, more generally, in a procedural process to obtain a new employment 
opportunity. These responsibilities absorb many PES operators and put the already modest capacity 
of employment offices at risk. Without doubt, a first direction towards a more efficient and effective 
system should require a reduction in the bureaucratic tasks and/or their outsourcing (e.g. using a call 
centre to manage such issues). The joint consideration of the figure on employment service staff and 
that on users’ satisfaction levels (see Appendix) suggests that the perceived service quality is not 
proportional to the number of dedicated staff.  In contrast, a correlation emerges between perceived 
quality and the presence of a good social fabric (social services, schools, infrastructures), a dynamic 
economic system (measured by a relevant labour demand), and employment offices with good 
information sets (data bases, skill needs analysis). 
                                                                                                                                                                                                
Spain), over 60% of young people are in temporary employment; in the EU, 10% of those under 25 are 
employed without contracts, and 30% are at risk of poverty because they get sub-minimum wages, especially 
in the UK, Germany and Greece. 
8
 Olivieri (2013) points out that “… the Veneto Region reported 31 thousand new entries in the job mobility 
lists. The Region employs approximately 450 civil servants in its employment services. The ratio is, then, 69 
workers in mobility for each operator. Theoretically speaking, this means that each operator should 
implement all of the required 4 levels of intervention for 69 unemployed persons. The work load is definitely 
excessive and the actual chances of obtaining the desired results are basically null. Moreover, not all the PES 
operators are dedicated to those services. In other Regions there figures are even more unfavourable”. 
9
 See the Monitoring Report on PES by the Ministry of Labour and Social Policy, 2013:  
http://www.cliclavoro.gov.it/Barometro-Del-Lavoro/Documents/Rapporto_monitoraggio_SPI_2013.pdf 
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Moreover, the hazy division of legislative responsibilities between Regions and the Central 
Government over labour issues generated a substantial uncertainty. In fact, as the organisation of 
PES’s was transferred to Regions and is regulated by autonomous regional laws, there is a 
considerable heterogeneity in PES organisational models across Regions, as well as significant 
regional differences in the definition of services, on the very concept of public service, and on the 
presence of competing private actors in the market. In this sense, the modest performance of PES 
could also depend from the scarce efficiency and organisational ability of local institutions, 
especially those with a larger basin of potential service recipients. 
Tab 2 – Public employment offices staff, resources, and unemployed people, 2007 and 2013. 
 Staff PEO Dimen-
sion 
Jobseekers 2007 Jobseekers 2012 Resources (000€) 
 
PEO Cost x 
jobseeker 
  
a 
 
b 
 
c=a/b 
 
d 
 
e=d/a 
 
f 
 
g=f/a 
2005 
     h 
2010  
i 
2005 
l=h/d 
2010 
m=i/f 
Germany 74,099 838 88.4 3,602 48.6 2,316 31.2 6,566 9,469 € 1.823 € 4.089 
Spain 7,996 826 9.7 1,834 229.4 5,769 721.4 834 1,319 € 455 € 229 
France 28,459 2,374 12 1,300 45.7 3,002 105.4 4,035 5,866 € 3.104 € 1.954 
Italy 9,989 539 18.5 1,506 150.8 2,744 274.7 553 483 € 367 € 176 
Sweden 10,248 325 31.5 296 28.9 403 39.3 528 907 € 1.784 € 2.251 
UK 67,110 1,012 66.3 1,623 24.2 2,511 37.4 7,076 5,420 € 4.360 € 2.159 
* Monitoring PES 2010, years 2007-2012. Source: elaboration on ILO and Eurostat data 
A comparative exercise on PES expenditure and staffing levels in major European countries 
(Bergamante and Marocco, 2014) highlights the different attention that different countries dedicated 
to national PES systems: quite expectedly, it is found that countries that are spending more on their 
PES, also show better performances (see Tab 2). This is  a warning that it is neither possible to 
effectively address employment problems without adequate resources, nor without a sustained 
labour demand. The higher the expenditure, the higher the attention to the needs of the unemployed 
is required. In this frame of mind, the situation looks alarming if we consider the data for Italy and 
observe that while unemployment almost doubled, the financial resources put into PES over the 
observation period (2007-2012) actually decreased. 
In the field of ALMP’s, Europe is moving at different speeds and on different trajectories. On the 
one side we find proactive countries that tried to timely prevent problems and, on the other side, 
there are countries (typically from the Mediterranean area) still experiencing severe emergency 
situations (Fig. 1). 
The international comparison makes the need of an urgent ‘restyling’ of Italian labour market 
policies and institutions directly evident, and even more so for the national PES that reached its 
physical capacity limit. The per-capita workload of PES staff has increased considerably over the 
years, well beyond the threshold compatible with satisfying service levels. 
The explosive contingency, that caused massive job losses, has been addressed with an increase in 
the employment insurance coverage: amidst the economic crisis, Italy spent 20 billion Euros in 
passive labour market policies (PLMP) and just 5 billion Euros in ALMP (Eurostat 2012). The 
overwhelming majority of other EU Member States, even if adopting different strategy mix, used 
both kinds of policies extensively. In this respect, it is interesting to look at the labour market policy 
expenditure composition before and after the crisis erupted, and see that PLMP superseded ALMP 
passing from a 3:2 ratio (€ 9.4 bn / € 6.0 bn) in 2007 to an almost 10:2 ratio (€ 20.1 bn / € 4.7 bn) in 
2011. 
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Fig. 1 - Resources dedicated to PES (in million Euros and in % of GDP) 
 
*For Italy, the PES expenditure is composed of € 384ml for staff, € 33ml for general expenses,     
66ml/€ for consultancy and information.  
Source: elaboration Eurostat data, 2011 
Speaking of the Italian PES in 2013, the Undersecretary of the Ministry of Labour, Carlo 
Dell’Aringa, stated10 that “If one does not spend for things that are not working, they will continue 
not to work”. Indeed, countries that have invested less in PES and ALMP and more in PLMP are 
now in comparatively worst situations, stuck in the middle between huge expenditures that are by 
now socially irrevocable and that are draining the few available resources, and the need of 
stimulating employment and the economy. 
The results from a trial of the Provincial Labour Market Observatory of the Province of Turin (a 
territory particularly affected by the economic crisis), analysing the occupational paths of 59,000 
people who lost their job, hint at a different direction. Of the people considered in the trial, 23,000 
turned to a public employment centre and the remaining 36,000 used other available channels, also 
including informal channels. The ‘follow-up’, realised through the compulsory employment 
communications, shows that 53% of those visiting public employment centres found a new 
employment within 12 months of losing their job, compared to 40% of those using other channels. 
The Council Member for Labour in person recognised it as a “significant figure … given the natural 
inclination of public employment centres to better serve the weaker categories in the labour force”. 
Among the possible explanations of such a result is the frequent use of temporary work agencies: 
those workers who turn to an institutional channel in their search for a new occupation, show a 
higher probability of using professional operators in the matching between labour demand and 
supply. Hence, the mentioned trial provides new sparks to the debate on the PES’s reform stressing 
the necessity of investing in the integration between public and private actors rather than in more 
popular competition improving measures. In fact, a better public-private integration could lead to a 
reduction in the use of informal and non-organised channels, often seen as causes for the 
inefficiency and scarce inclusiveness of the Italian labour market. 
4. Job search and employment transitions 
The world of work is ever more complex and requires labour regulations and institutions ready to 
manage the continuous changes in a well-structured and consistent variety of forms. The phases of 
job search and work integration are no longer confined to the first part of a person’s active life, but 
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 ISFOL Press Release following the Seminar for the Youth Guarantee in Italy, 4 December 2013. 
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rather continue and reappear during the whole working life of an individual. Labour market 
intermediation, job transitions, and their relations require specific instruments and a constant 
updating so as to keep employability and labour market reintegration ability high. 
Starting from the 1990s, the Italian PES’s underwent several reforms aimed at renewing their 
organisation, functioning modalities and stakeholders. Already with the 1997 Reform
11
, the focus 
was shifted from providing placement services to employability services. The 1997 Reform 
transformed PES along four fundamental guidelines: 1) the redistribution of responsibilities from 
central to local authorities in managing public policies (‘subsidiarity principle’); 2) the revision of 
policy implementation modalities, where the employment list system was abandoned in favour of 
new responsibilities concerning the provision of services to support job seekers actively in their 
search for (re-)employment; 3) the recognition of the need to combine employment, training, and 
social policies for more vulnerable categories of workers; 4) the ‘horizontal’ interpretation of the 
subsidiarity principle, allowing private actors to provide services to match labour supply and 
demand
12
. Drawing a sports parallel, one intuitively understands the interpretation mistake that is 
made by assessing PES’s based on their direct employment placement ability (Barbieri, 2002). In 
team games, each player has a specific role and individual performance needs to be judged on an 
assessment against specific criteria relating to the ‘team play’. In soccer, is it correct to evaluate a 
midfielder’s performance based on the number of goals scored, as one would more likely do for a 
striker? The PES is the playmaker in the labour market and only occasionally realises direct 
employment placement (‘goal’), while much more often it acts indirectly (‘assist’).  
In Fig.2, we show ISFOL PLUS data (2011) for PES’s intermediation and employment placement 
after 2003: even though public employment centres display a poor 4% performance in direct 
placement at the national level, interpreting this result as a proof of PES’s inability to carry out their 
functions would be a mistake. In fact, in 26% of cases, public employment centres represent one of 
the necessary steps to undertake in order to find a job (the so-called ‘indirect function’). In this 
respect, PES has to be regarded as a fundamental player in the labour market, also considering that 
it manages the most vulnerable segment of unemployed, carrying out a social inclusion function. 
The services provided by the public employment centres are not immediately finalised to direct 
placement, but rather to career guidance, information, profiling, and requalification. 
These latter functions are preparatory to the actual direct intermediation, net of those forms of 
informal intermediation that are very relevant (between 35-40%) even if they do not pass through 
the labour market but, rather, impoverish it reducing available opportunities
13
. Something that is 
worthwhile noting is that the presence of PES is spread over the entire national territory, while 
private services
14
 intermediate much more in the Centre-North and less in the South. The private 
                                                          
11
 Legislative Decree n. 469/1997. 
12
 Final Report of the project ‘FIS - Flexicurity integrated services’, launched by Fondirigenti and financed 
by the European Commission, 2011. 
13
 The negative effect of informal intermediation is multidimensional: on the one hand, it reduces 
opportunities for those not having a network (‘rationing effect’) and, on the other hand, it hinders selection 
(merit, competition, etc.), as the opportunity is not given to the best possible candidate (‘prevarication 
effect’). 
14
 The commercial nature of such employment services obviously explains some behaviours but, at the same 
time, raises many doubts on their ability to act with a public mandate to provide services that represent a 
subjective entitlement. Around 80% of agencies choose to engage in a reduced set of activities only, 
preferring to work in an exclusive environment. However, around 90% of private agencies provide the 
following services: CV gathering, screening, competences profile, analysis of prospective employer, data 
base maintenance. Many of them (70%) provide assistance in the workplace integration and continue to 
monitor candidates once they are employed, while less than 50% of private agencies provide career 
guidance, supervise the activities by the employer, provide or suggest training activities; and less than a third 
of private agencies take care of administrative fulfilments upon employment (Chiozza and Marocco, 2011). 
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‘recruitment, temporary contract work, and consultancy’ agencies that are accredited by the 
Ministry of Labour, feature a strong asymmetric territorial distribution on the national territory with 
80% of them concentrated in the North. It is reasonable to assume that the cause for this is the 
proximity to the labour demand. 
Fig. 2 – Job search after 2003: intermediation and direct employment placement 
 
Source: ISFOL PLUS, 2011 
The YG purpose is clearly universal and inclusive
15
, as the YG is designed for more vulnerable and 
less equipped recipients to stay in the labour market. For this reason, is ever more important to 
avoid the risk of adverse selection by some private providers to the detriment of ‘marginal’ subjects 
who are difficult to integrate into the labour market and, hence, less profitable from their point of 
view. To address this issue, in Tab.3 we compare the most commonly offered services by private 
providers (Temporary work agencies, APL in Italian) with those provided by public employment 
centres by looking at the experience of users in both cases. The differences are striking and underlie 
an adverse selection activity by private agencies against subjects with lower education, those living 
in southern regions, women, older workers, and people having a father with a lower education (used 
as a proxy for the family network). 
Having a mix of public and private actors is realistically necessary and inevitable
16
. Nonetheless, 
the emergence of ‘free riding’ (the irregular use of benefits, subsidies or tax breaks) and 
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 In the Youth Plan, as well as in the National Plan and the Regional Implementation Plans, the principle of 
universal access is assumed, and that needs to be guaranteed through the PES regional networks in order to 
give all young people the possibility of obtaining information on the opportunities offered by the PES. 
16
 Zanaboni (2013) identifies three different models: 1) the ‘matching level’ model (Lombardy system) 
where both public employment centres and private actors may take charge of the jobseekers through a 
voucher mechanism (a ‘dowry’, as it is called) and the payment of the private actor subordinated to 
occupational results; 2) a ‘mixed’ model where jobseekers are received and taken charge of by the PES but 
where, in case the PES considers an intervention by a private agent to be useful and appropriate, a voucher is 
issued that the user may spend by an accredited private operator of her/his choice. Also in this case, the 
private operator will be paid in case of success. 3) the ‘public model with private support’ where jobseekers 
are received and taken charge of by the PES and where, in case the PES considers the support by a private 
agent to be useful and appropriate, it engages private agents that have been pre-selected through a public 
tender. 
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‘creaming’17 (the selection and subsequent marginalisation of most vulnerable subjects) occurrences 
will be an inescapable fact
18
.  The higher the risk of discriminatory behaviours, the stronger the 
convenience of assigning - at least – the responsibility of citizens’ profiling to the PES. 
Tab. 3 – Systematic selection in intermediation channels 
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Lower secondary 20 9 29 35 50 34 13 33 32 35 51 
Upper secondary 50 43 58 47 43 50 51 45 55 47 44 
University degree 30 47 13 18 7 16 36 22 13 18 5 
Geographical Area 100 99 100 10
0 
100 10
0 
100 100 100 100 100 
North-West 45 35 40% 34 30 33 26 24 42 30 25 
North-East 23 23 22 27 20 25 20 23 27 22 18 
Centre 16 20 20 22 22 21 22 18 19 21 23 
South and Islands 16 22 18 17 28 20 32 35 12 27 34 
Gender 100 100 60,4 10
0 
100 99 100 100 100 100 100 
Male 64 51 60 66 61 57 46 75 59 59 56 
Female 36 49 40 34 39 43 54 25 41 41 44 
Age class 100 100 100 10
0 
100 10
0 
100 100 100 100 100 
18 - 24 11 11 6 4 8 7 1 2 10 6 6 
25 -29 16 14 10 7 10 11 3 7 16 9 6 
30 -39 37 34 33 31 31 33 17 28 44 29 27 
40 - 49 24 24 36 32 32 28 35 35 24 31 35 
50 - 64 12 17 15 26 19 21 44 28 6 25 26 
Father’s education 100 100 100 10
0 
100 10
0 
100 100 100 100 100 
Lower secondary 61 58 70 75 82 75 74 74 69 76 86 
Upper secondary and 
Univ. 
39 42 30 25 18 25 26 26 31 24 14 
  100 100 100 10
0 
100 10
0 
100 100 100 100 100 
Note (*) Temporary Work Agencies  Source: ISFOL PLUS, 2011 
 
Moreover, the focus on measuring the placement capacity alone may trigger opportunistic 
behaviours (by agencies eager to cash the ‘dowry’), cronyism and favouritism (facilitated by the 
importance of informal intermediation), and create ‘false targets’ (an extemporary, occasional job 
does not solve the individual’s employment problems). Looking at the profile of those not resorting 
to the ‘Friends, family, acquaintance’ channel, we find that they are typically persons with higher 
levels of education. Hence, it becomes necessary to monitor the matching methods that are used and 
to continue with the monitoring also after the placement has occurred, paying attention to the 
employment quality in terms of contractual forms, compensation, and employment adequacy. 
Another important quantitative aspect to analyse is represented by the transitions into the labour 
force and into employment, both in terms of times and quality of dynamics. From this perspective, 
the evolution (positive outcomes), as well as the involution (negative outcomes) in the employment 
status have to be closely monitored to support individual solutions most swiftly and efficiently from 
the social point of view, as well as to be able to evaluate interventions and correct negative 
trajectories. The economic crisis inevitably slowed down the physiological transformation process 
of atypical employment contracts into typical forms of employment and the labour market has 
become less permeable as the entry into the market, first, and the employment stabilisation, after, 
are less likely and more difficult.  The conversion speed of flexible contracts into open-ended 
                                                          
17
 The expression most commonly used is ‘creaming and parking’, i.e. helping jobseekers who are closer to 
work and ignoring everyone else. 
18
 The YG has to be implemented according to the ‘equal opportunity’ principle and, even if the risk of moral 
hazard is explicitly recalled, it is not suggested how to effectively contrast it.  
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employment contracts dropped, and the incidence of negative outcomes increased. Even though the 
stock of flexible contracts decreased over the last years, due to the exit from labour market of a 
relevant share of precarious workers, the flow of new precarious workers increased, mainly because 
it is quite rare, nowadays, that a new employee is hired on the basis of a permanent contract. 
In Italy the share of autonomous workers is quite relevant (approximately 25%) and well beyond 
the average European levels. This may be interpreted as a source of extraordinary system flexibility, 
in one sense, but it also exposes the weakest part of this kind of employment to high risks, due to 
the existing poor system of social security rights and guarantees for them. 
In order to appreciate the impact of the economic crisis on occupational dynamics, we consider 
Fig.3, where transitions are shown with respect to 2005 and 2011, also bearing in mind that over 
that period the legislation on labour market entry flexibility has not changed significantly. The first 
remark is that the crisis has negatively affected the ‘bridge effect’, which occurs when atypical 
employment works as a bridge into regular employment: in 2005-2006 the transition to typical 
employment interested over 5% workers more than it did in 2010-2011. 
Also the ‘entry effect’ of flexible contracts has been partly moderated: in 2005-2006 the transition 
from unemployment to some form of atypical work interested 17% of unemployed, while in the 
period 2010-2011 the figure dropped to 12.8%. The reliance on the so-called ‘posto fisso’ 
(‘permanent job’ in Italian) has been weakened as well: in the pre-crisis period, less than 2% of 
permanent jobs moved into unemployment; five years later, probably as an effect of the economic 
crisis, the percentage rose to a dramatic 7.3%. 
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Fig. 3 – Comparison between labour force transitions in 2005-2006 and in 2010-2011 
 
Source: ISFOL PLUS, Panel 2005-2006 and Panel 2010-2011 
In the period comparison, a singularity emerges looking at the permanence in atypical work (the so-
called ‘trap effect’) that decreased by 11 percentage points between the two transition periods. The 
key of this apparent paradox is that a large part of this reduction is explained by the loss of atypical 
work: the transition ‘atypical work  unemployment’ interested 5.9% of atypical workers in the 
period 2005-2006 and 20% of atypical workers in the period 2010-2011.  
The economic crisis seems to have emphasised a ‘bounce back effect’ into unemployment. The 
analysis of atypical work transitions suggests a close relation to the economic crisis. In particular, 
the period comparison shows that the economic deterioration was followed by an analogous 
worsening of employment both in qualitative and quantitative terms. These considerations become 
very interesting as far as the profiling of prospective PES users is concerned, because the profiling 
itself has a dynamic nature that is substantially following economic trends and cycles with 
implications that are not always easy to predict. 
 It is worth stressing that the duration of atypical employment contracts has an important influence 
on the permanence in employment (Fig.4): in the observed periods, atypical workers with contract 
lasting less than 6 months move into unemployment in 35% of cases, compared to 15% of those 
with contracts of longer duration. The shortness of the employment contract reduces the incidence 
of transitions to typical work by over 10 percentage points, compared to those of superior length. 
The changes in the volumes underlying the transitions show that the increase in flexibility has 
affected the quality of employment much more than it has affected its quantity, weakening the 
logical, dominant syllogism ‘more flexibility = less unemployment’. 
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Fig. 4 – Labour force outcomes by duration of atypical contract, 2010-2011 (%) 
 
Source: ISFOL PLUS, Panel 2010-2011 
We illustrated the main trends in intermediation (in the searching phase, first, and in the matching 
phase, after) and in transitions. What emerges is a pejorative reshuffling in employment quantities 
and qualities highlighted by an increase in informal intermediation and a decrease in typical, open-
ended employment.  
The boundary between employment and non-employment is now very thin and many workers, who 
are employed on the basis of non-standard employment relationships (part-time work, fixed-term 
contracts, and self-employment) and are economically fragile, could demand services similar to 
those offered to the unemployed
19
. This implies abandoning the idea that career guidance, 
vocational training, and, in general, the entire set of services provided by the PES are for exclusive 
use of the unemployed. Indeed, any kind of employment contract, in time of economic crisis and 
increasing dismissals, is nothing but a partial guarantee.  
No season of life is safe from unexpected setbacks; keeping own employability high is now a 
continual and multi-sided need, because the same person may be vulnerable, today, in one aspect 
(maybe the need of further education and training) and tomorrow in another one (rights, guarantees, 
pensions). Nevertheless, even the most efficient and modern PES system will never be good enough 
in the absence of a sustained (and, qualified) labour demand, of a transparent market (the informal 
sector absorbs over a third of the opportunities), and higher skill premiums in the labour market (to 
make education and training decisions more rational)
20
. 
                                                          
19
 Beyond the popular aggregate represented by young  NEET (Not in Education, Employment or Training), 
it becomes important to overcome the ‘exclusive status’ logic and look at many dimensions simultaneously. 
Think, for example, of a young person that is studying, working part-time and looking for a new job, all at 
the same time. 
20
 In a nutshell: we are in presence of a modest labour demand, partially irregular and partially informal. 
What has been done to address this situation? The choice was to act on the marginal part of formal 
intermediation with new actors (private agencies) that will provide services (VET, career guidance, etc.) but 
not direct placement, i.e. employment. In other European countries private agencies function as a sort of 
‘employment brokers’ in charge of finding a job to their customers in exchange of a fee payment. In Italy 
this business is simply not present and, hence, using public money to provide services that will not result in 
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5. Profiling models and scenarios 
In this section we offer a glimpse at some virtuous PES models present in Europe, to conclude with 
some scenarios for Italy. 
Giubileo et al. (2013) analyse the Dutch model – probably one of the most advanced – based on a 
complex screening system characterised by its ability to continuously self-improve and restructure 
through a process of trials and errors. The most interesting aspect is that the public service cannot 
directly provide reallocation services but has to buy them on the private market via public tenders, 
so as to achieve a reduction in expenditures and, at the same time, favour the competition among 
private actors, which should improve the quality of offered services. After a first phase, some 
unemployed with higher employability have been taken away from the private services because 
considered to be able to find a job autonomously. The underlying idea is that the public service 
should only be involved in the profiling stage, i.e. assign a re-integration score to the unemployed: 
the higher the score, the more measures will have to be adopted for the person’s re-employment. 
The service intensity is proportional to the individual employability deficit, which is contextualised 
in time and space. In this system, it is quite difficult for a private agent to engage in ‘cherry picking’ 
activities
21
. Moreover, the ‘parking’22 phenomenon is fought by making the payment conditional on 
positive results (the service is paid only once the customer is employed with a contract of a 
minimum duration of 6 months). There is also an additional bonus system for swift placement if the 
salary received substitutes the unemployment benefits. A last tranche of payment concerns post-
placement services (the longer the customer stays in the labour market, the higher the payment 
received by the private agency) with the purpose of contrasting gaming activities
23
. 
Policy results are independently evaluated twice a year and whenever a private agent does not pass 
the test against predetermined indicators, it has to develop and present an improvement plan or it 
loses the quality mark that is necessary to participate to future tenders. In 2005, 50% of unemployed 
persons participating to the scheme re-entered into employment. 
Ichino (2014), in his proposal for an Employee Repositioning Work Contract (ERWC) for Italy, 
looks at public employment services as ‘one stop shop’, i.e. places where the unemployed person 
can receive, among other services, information, career guidance, and employability profiling. The 
project also envisages the launch of accredited private outplacement agencies, competing with each 
other, through vouchers issued by the competent Region and that are paid only after the policy 
beneficiary has actually re-entered employment. The objection to this solution is that it would 
humiliate the role of public employment centres. The answer to the objection is that the service does 
not lose its public nature just because is carried out by private agencies. 
There are also other concrete examples of experimentation in Italy. In the Lombardy Region, labour 
market policies are based on three pillars: 1) having result oriented services; 2) introducing standard 
costs; 3) promoting competition. Public employment centres remain in the system but are put in 
competition with private agencies. The mechanism is powered by the ‘Work Dowry’ (Dote Unica 
Lavoro, in Italian) that is the universal instrument for supporting the employment of all citizens 
during their lifetime. The model envisages an endowment, the ‘dowry’, that each recipient will 
                                                                                                                                                                                                
employment directly is a risky business and could be unfit to fight and resolve structural problems such as 
the weak labour demand and the imperfect transparency of recruiting. 
21
 Meaning the selection or ‘creaming’ of the unemployed who are easiest to reallocate. 
22
 Meaning the scarce attention given to most vulnerable unemployed who are ‘parked’ in VET or similar 
ancillary services. 
23
 Meaning various alterations in the number of customers effectively placed to obtain public incentives. 
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chose where to use to get employment services. The emphasis here is on the centrality of the person 
and freedom of choice, as well as on simplification. 
There are many more models, both national and European, that would be worth discussing, but the 
discussion on technical arrangements is only part of the issue: it is likely that the main limitations of 
those models are not to be found in their contents, but rather in their container. In fact, quite rarely 
the transplant of foreign virtuous models resulted in a success leading to similar performances 
(think of Flexicurity and apprenticeship). The territorial heterogeneity characterising Italy (quite 
straightforwardly Lombardy is one of the most economically developed regions in Europe, while 
Calabria is one of the most depressed) alone could be reason enough to have new schemes fail just 
because of the different interpretations of the actors involved. 
However, if, on the one hand, the pressure for a prompt intervention in favour of the younger 
segment of the labour force is strong, on the other hand, resources are scarce and need to be 
distributed carefully. The YG cannot be interpreted – and it should not be – as a subjective 
entitlement, but rather as a strengthening of services to guarantee young people and the actual 
realisation of Art.3 of the Italian Constitution
24
. Despite the undeniable emergency situation, the 
very nature of the services that are overlapping with the fundamental individual rights ratified by 
the Italian Constitution makes it inconvenient to transfer to private actors some functions such as 
the employment status certification (right to work) and profiling (determining service kind and 
intensity). 
With the YG, the rules of engagement between the unemployed and the public employment centre 
(or the correspondent private APL) do not change and remain those specified in the ‘service 
agreement’25; the YG intervenes by identifying a specific status and defining the service intensity so 
as to fulfil the right. In the Italian version, vulnerability profiles are used as a sort of ‘shadow 
prices’ for the service, similarly to what happens with health services refunds26. The profiling 
activity identifies individuals that are disadvantaged according to determined categories and is 
needed to assess the urgency and, like in a sort of ‘employment E.R.’, the system of priorities in the 
service provision. Each of these priorities
27
 should receive a determined budget, that is inversely 
proportional to the recipient’s individual employability level and that is to be used by service 
providers. However, an extreme profiling risks to lead to paradoxical results where, we either have 
blatancies digressing into the field of social services (e.g. ‘a woman from the South, 27 y.o., with a 
low education level has low chances of being employed and is in need of longer, diversified, more 
costly and riskier set of employment services’), or we build such a complex system of prior 
probabilities prone to generate perverse effects (e.g. subjects who are favoured by the system just 
for their scarce study aptitude, compared to those who exerted higher levels of effort). 
                                                          
24
 The Art.3 of the Constitution of the Italian Republic reads: “All citizens have equal social dignity and are 
equal before the law, without distinction of sex, race, language, religion, political opinion, personal and 
social conditions.  
It is the duty of the Republic to remove those obstacles of an economic or social nature which constrain the 
freedom and equality of citizens, thereby impeding the full development of the human person and the 
effective participation of all workers in the political, economic and social organisation of the country.”. 
25
 The European Employment Strategy envisages a tool to regulate the relations between beneficiaries, PES 
and ALMP providers with the aim of empowering and activating the unemployed towards the creation of a 
personalised path leading to the reintegration into the labour market.  
26
 The private actor provides the service substituting the public providers, according to the parameters 
defined by public authorities and at a pre-determined cost. 
27
 Giubileo and Pastore (2013) suggest the following classification: a) job-ready individuals able to find 
employment autonomously; b) in need of a minimum assistance; c) in need of a continual and dedicated 
assistance; d) in need of a continual and dedicated assistance, placement is possible only with incentives to 
prospective employers. 
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There are many potential traps: think of a person receiving a service just because residing a few 
meters inside a Regional boundary or because was born a few months after another person, etc. 
There is the risk of unjust and counterintuitive choices. Another category of risks stems from the 
fact of working on priorities: the public employment centres may be polarised between those acting 
like social service offices
28
 and those providing mere certification services. And what would be 
more convenient and equitable between concentrating the few scarce resources available on people 
with a higher human capital and those with a lower human capital and lower employability? 
Creating a competitive advantage (a ‘dowry’, an incentive, a tax break) for some months only could 
distort market incentives for the worse, as well as being ephemeral because new emergencies will 
occur that will require new preferential services in competition with the old ones. Such a loop could 
lead the entire system to a short circuit. Merit and equity are in a precarious equilibrium: it is 
impossible to protect one at the expense of the other. 
The calculation of the ‘vulnerability risk’ is not an easy task. Thanks to the Panel ISFOL PLUS, 
with direct respondents, we can draw some scenarios. Starting from the transitions related to the 
period 2010-2011, we can look at theoretical populations. The profiling instrument needs to be agile 
and, due to the essentially operational purposes, we are not showing an econometric model. In Fig.5 
the persons looking for a job in 2010 have been monitored in their path to employment placement, 
looking at what outcomes they obtained in 2011. In order to build more scenarios, three aggregates 
have been selected. 1) persons looking for a job in 2010 who visited an employment centre in the 
preceding 12 months; 2) all the persons looking for a job in 2010, without any distinctions; 3) 
persons looking for a job in 2010 aged less than 25 y.o. The dimensions of the three aggregates are 
intentionally different, both in terms of employed and unemployed persons, with the purpose of 
representing the minimum and maximum user base that the PES system may face. In operational 
terms, this projection should not differ much from those that employment centres should produce at 
the territorial level to best prepare to the potential user base, both in terms of service typology and 
in terms of the service volume to be provided. 
Histograms in Fig.5 show the positive transition outcome: the attainment of employment. These 
ratios are relative frequencies, interpretable as the probability of being employed in the period (the 
darker one in relation of the entire population, the brighter in relation to the labour force). 
The lower this probability, the higher the vulnerability and, with consecutive increases in specific 
vulnerability factors, the ‘administrative priority’ of the individual has to increase. For example, in 
Fig 5.1, each year, there are 1.2 million unemployed visiting an employment centres; 35% of them 
find a job in the period. The best performance are reported by those who have been unemployed for 
a short period, residents in Centre-North, with a higher education, who are men, and under 30 year 
of age. 
                                                          
28
 The European Commission (2013) maintains the need of investing in the social sector to support growth 
and cohesion through the ESF programme 2014-2020, with the aim of facing the current economic crisis and 
the demographic change expected for the next decades. This is a change of approach: social investments 
become part of a defensive strategy from being an expression of a generous and parasite welfare. This new 
approach is indeed focusing more on prevention rather than on shock therapy, on maintaining rather than 
repairing human capital, investing from early in life in inexpensive corrective actions, rather than in costly 
emergency fixing. The concept is recalled that the costs the community pays today in social services will 
correspond to future savings. Looking at the PES from this perspective, timely social policies could have 
avoided the current labour market situation that the PES itself is asked to solve by spending much more, both 
in terms of public resources and individuals’ opportunity costs.  
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Fig. 5 – Profiling unemployed persons in 2010; outcomes 2011 
 
Source: ISFOL PLUS, Panel 2010-2011 
In Fig 5.2 we have the dynamics for unemployed persons in general and reflect the discussed 
features. The number of subjects potentially in need of the employment service is almost 3.7 million 
people (2010-2011); slightly more than a million among them found a job within the following 
year. The longitudinal reading shows that the average probability of finding an employment is 29%, 
while it was 34% for those who visited an employment centre, to reinforce the idea that the PES has 
to be good at something. 
In Fig. 5.3, we have the people representing the core of the YG: unemployed persons under 25. In 
absolute terms they are slightly more than 700,000 but the snapshot continues to propose the same 
old story: in terms of future employability: is better to be a male, with a higher education, residing 
in the Centre-North, being unemployed for less than a year. 
We need to remind that there is a strong random component when reading the panel: the expected 
outcomes are transition probabilities, where the persons’ heterogeneity plays a relevant role, i.e. 
they have to be intended as scenarios, confined by the reliability of the sample, and not as economic 
forecasts. This consideration assumes a strong relevance particularly because the provision of 
employment services is conditional on statistically determined parameters: the relations between 
State and individuals are not so clear anymore and depend on individual characteristics
29
 such as 
                                                          
29
 Think of the YG itself or of the Italian ISEE, the Equivalent Economic Situation Indicator, that  is a 
statistical instrument used to assess the economic situation of households, constituting the basis for applying 
for social benefits or subsidised care services. ISEE takes into account household income, assets, and the 
characteristics of the family. 
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age, place (Region of residence), and on – often very random – available resources, in this way 
creating shadows on the receivability of public services and on the very concept of universality of 
rights. 
6. Conclusions 
The changes in the organisation of the Italian PES carried out over the past decades have tended to 
create a more modern intermediation system, able to favour rapid school to work  and non-standard 
to standard employment transitions. The many introduced innovations have concerned both the 
normative and technological aspects. First of all, the promotion and liberalisation of intermediation 
represented a strong cultural shift, considering that until the late 1990’s paid intermediation 
activities were forbidden. Information technology also played an important role in providing a 
virtual space for job vacancies, a demand and supply observatory that allows the vocational 
guidance and training of jobseekers as well as a satisfactory level of labour supply-demand 
matching. Finally, another important cultural shift concerned the change of perspective on the 
unemployed person that passed from being a passive subject, often lost in an increasingly complex 
labour market, to being the target of activation initiatives aimed at her/his inclusion in the labour 
market. With the new Job Act currently under its Parliamentary approval process, the innovation 
route becomes richer, in the sense that the provision of employment services, together with active 
and passive labour market policies, will be centralised in a single authority. This further 
innovation introduces a jobseeker agreement implying specific terms on the path to 
(re)employment. Of course, as maintained in this paper, there is a long way to go yet, to achieve a 
full accomplishment of these goals. 
In a way, the Italian version of the YG is an implicit guilty plea by older generations who consumed 
resources and institutions without worrying for future generations to come. The recent Italian 
history is characterised by a vision intent on minimising the role of the public sector, a model that 
led to the weakening of PES in financial and staffing terms
30
. As a result, youth policies have often 
been nothing more than a ‘trompe l'oeil’, creating the illusion for future prospects and deceiving the 
real situation. In the meanwhile, both the European Employment Strategy (EES) and Europe 2020 
reasserted the need of modernising Public Employment Services as an instrument to manage ALMP 
and most European countries responded to this call by increasing PES expenditure and staffing, 
starting from 2000. 
The current nature and organisation of the Italian PES may, on the one hand, absorb YG measure in 
an excessively complex and inefficient system and, on the other hand, provide a very marginal 
support to an extremely large recipients audience, in this way jeopardising the effectiveness of the 
measures themselves. In the Italian case, as far as intermediation and job search are concerned, the 
informal intermediation channel needs to be contrasted, as it creates huge inefficiencies and 
distortions, as well as eroding the economic dimension of the labour market (for over 40%): 
structural incentives to transparent recruiting and employment should be designed in collaboration 
with the PES acting as a guarantor authority. This would probably be an equitable and efficient 
measure to undertake. Also, on the aspect of labour market transitions into labour force and 
employment, the PES role needs to be filled up with contents, functions, and intervention 
competences. There is plenty to do and, given the discontinuity and the poor quality of flexible 
employments with a carousel of atypical contracts less and less remunerated, with scarce social 
contributions and very modest professional development, it is not difficult to imagine what further 
roles could the PES take on. Nevertheless, the recent trend in Italian labour legislation has 
persistently pointed at the direction of removing constraints from the employment relation and, 
hence, it is difficult to think of the PES system as actively intervening in employment relations. 
                                                          
30
 The present condition is the result of a campaign against everything that is ‘public’, considered to be too 
costly and inefficient (Mandrone, 2014). 
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The turning point faced by the system of ALMP and its ‘armed branch’, the PES system, poses two 
alternatives: innovating the process or innovating the product (or both!). Granted that the current 
financial and staffing resources allocated to the PES are inadequate for either functions, still not 
much has been said on the ‘new product’ side, i.e. on the support, guidance, innovation, funding, 
counselling, and other service activities that PES should provide to beneficiaries in the future. The 
PES has not to be intended as a rehab centre for weak persons; the choice of innovating just with 
respect to the process is dangerous when the product is useless and obsolete and is not conducing to 
realise the Communitarian recommendation for better services and new functions. The Council 
Recommendation on establishing the YG suggested a new role for the PES as an instrument to 
provide supportive measures to help young people find a route into economic activity, but then, 
other Communitarian documents suggest that PES should also provide services to employed and 
unemployed of any kind to support them throughout their transitions from unemployment, inactivity 
or education into work and the other way around during their active life. One may think of a ‘Life 
Long PES’, that supports the citizen when she is still in the school system (school choice and 
transition school-work), when she needs to enter the labour market (intermediation, job search and 
placement), when she needs to consolidate her employment (bargaining and career) and maintain 
her employability (continuing vocational education and training, CVET). Such a complex set of 
services could be provided through the figure of a tutor, a coach accompanying the person over the 
years, the transitions, and also the employment evolutions (career and return to work after parental 
leave), and the problems connected to employment (fundamental rights, parental leave, etc.). The 
political orientation of the last years hinted at the exclusion of PES from the management of 
measures like the YG in favour of private operators. In the paper we highlight the necessity of 
considerable investments for transforming public employment services into ‘transition management 
services’, in order to face the challenges posed by the YG. In systems with the presence of private 
actors, the accreditation measure is crucial and a system of feedback by users and other stakeholders 
should be envisioned to determine a ranking of private agencies and to guarantee a high and 
uniform quality. In whatever way these new employment services will be provided (public, private, 
mixed, through a federal system, locally or nationally, etc.), they will necessarily need precise and 
timely information to feed them and their action will have to be monitored by an independent 
subject. Provocatively speaking, it seems that the main challenge/opportunity posed by the 
introduction of the YG in the Italian case is not as much in promoting the integration of young 
people in the labour market, as rather in reorganising PES to make them able, in prospect, to 
‘support sustainable labour transitions throughout workers’ careers’. 
Another aspect that should be carefully addressed is the convenience of having a further 
intervention on labour supply as a priority. In fact, the labour market supply-side policies 
implemented over the last two decades resulted in a more and more flexible, precarious, 
discontinuous, ill-paid, and poor quality work that contributed little to the fight against the 
economic crisis. 
Many choices need to be made and the margins of error are quite thin, due to the situation of 
emergency derived from the combination of factors such as the high and increasing youth 
unemployment, the structural weakness of PES, and the tightening of public budgets. The Italian 
PES metamorphosis, started in 2000, from old and dusty placement office to the current multi-
service system for the promotion of labour market intermediation, and to the future role as pivotal 
player in individuals’ employment transitions represents a sort of re-enactment of the diverse 
political climates and economic orientations in the succession of governments Italy had over the last 
twenty years. Years of slowdowns, accelerations and sudden turns for the PES that generated a 
comprehensible widespread discomfort and disorientation in users and staff. We hope the worst is 
behind us. 
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Appendix 
The first graph in Fig. A1 shows the placement capacity. The graphs from 2 to 5 show some 
services that public employment services, in accordance with the 2000 Reform, should provide 
uniformly, the so-called Essential Levels of Services (‘Livelli Essenzali delle Prestazioni’, LEP in 
Italian). The last graph shows the number of users registered by the PES and number of DID, 
Statement of Immediate Availability (‘Dichiarazione di immediata disponibilità’, DID). 
Fig. A1 – PES, services demanded by Region: provided (positive values) and not provided 
(negative values) employment (placement capacity); training; information; career guidance; 
internship; registration and DID (PES users). 
 
